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Abstract 
Governance literature finds that the independent directors from the lending banks (CBDs) bring 
both financial expertise and conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholder.  We 
examine how the presence of CBDs affects the implicit incentive of CEO turnover. Using 
BoardEx and DealScan data, we hypothesize and find that CBDs make the CEO turnover more 
sensitive to both performance and risk. Post CEO turnover analysis reveals that firm performance 
improves and risk decreases in the presence of CBDs.
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I. Introduction
Board of directors play an important role of monitoring and advising the top managers 
(Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). Among all, independent directors from commercial 
banks (CBDs), receive much more attention from the economists (Black and Scholes, 1973; 
Booth and Deli, 1999; Güner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Hilscher and Şişli -Ciamarra, 2013; 
Kang and Kim, 2017; Kang, Kim, and Liao, 2019; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Mitchell and 
Walker, 2010; Şişli-Ciamarra, 2012), because they bring both financial expertise and conflict of 
interest between shareholders and debtholders.  
Through career training in commercial banking, CBDs become experts in risk 
management (John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) and in processing 
financial accounting information (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). While CBDs have a 
fiduciary duty to protect the shareholders’ interests that are by definition more risk tolerant than 
debt holders, they (especially the ones from lending banks) equally have important fiduciary duty to 
their employing banks, to minimize firm risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 
2013; Erkens, Subramanyam, and Zhang, 2014; Kang and Kim, 2017). Kang and Kim (2017) 
find that CBDs influence CEO’s compensation structure to be less sensitive to firm risk. While 
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best effort of the agent (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Kwon, 2005; Hallman, Hartzell, and 
Parsons, 2011). No paper has investigated the impact of CBDs on CEO turnover. Hence, we fill 
this gap in this paper. 
If CBDs bring more financial expertise to the board, CEO dismissal would be more 
sensitive to firm performance (“financial expertise hypothesis”).  On the other hand, if CBDs 
bring conflicts of interest to minimize firm risk, CEO turnover would be more sensitive to firm 
risk (“conflict of interest hypothesis”). These two hypotheses are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and testing them would bring a complete picture about the impact of CBDs on CEO 
incentives as a whole.
Using the intersection of BoardEx, DealScan, and CRSP/Compustat over 1999-2008, we 
find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance when CBDs are present.  The effect is 
stronger for affiliated banker directors (ABDs). While average investor response to the forced 
CEO turnover news is negative, such announcement return is significantly positive if CBDs are 
present, and even more so if prior performance was poor. Additionally, we track down the cases 
of forced CEO turnovers and analyze the subsequent performance under new CEOs. We find 
significant improvements in operating performance for firms with CBDs, and this is especially 
true when prior performance was poor.  These results coherently support the “financial expertise 
hypothesis.”  
We also find supporting evidence for “conflict of interest hypothesis.” The likelihood of 
CEO dismissal increases as firm risk increases, especially when ABDs are present. Our post-
turnover risk analysis shows that for firms with CBDs, idiosyncratic risk after CEO turnover-
year further decreases when prior risk is high. 
Overall, we find that CBDs, especially ABDs, are double edged sword in providing 
CEO’s implicit incentive. Their financial expertise makes CEO turnover more sensitive to firm 
performance, but their conflict of interest makes the turnover sensitive to risk, which may be 
against shareholder’s interests.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides literature review 
and main hypotheses, and Section 3 describes our data and empirical methods. Section 4 presents 
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II. Literature and Hypotheses development
Previous research suggests that effective boards show higher sensitivity to performance 
when firing a CEO (see Weisbach, 1988; Agrawal and Nasser, 2019; Dahya, McConnell, and 
Travlos, 2002; Dimopoulos and Wagner, 2016; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Wang, Xie, and Zhu 
(2015) suggest that directors’ industry expertise improves the board’s oversight role, which 
increases CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Since commercial bankers amass greater 
financial expertise and better debt market expertise (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1980; Byrd and 
Mizruchi, 2005; Dittman et al, 2010; Booth and Deli, 1999), we predict that these CBDs are 
better positioned to effectively work as monitors leading CEO turnovers to be more sensitive to 
firm performance (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). In addition, ABDs show intensive monitoring 
due to their affiliation with their own firm (Kang and Kim, 2017). Therefore, we predict the 
following:
H1) For firms with CBDs, forced turnover is more sensitive to firm performance and this 
effect would be more pronounced as there are more ABDs. 
Bankers are different from entrepreneurs in perceiving and managing risks (Sarasvathy, 
Simon, and Lave, 1998). They focus more on controlling risks and try to avoid situations where 
they may face higher levels of risk (Mitchell, 2015; Kang and Kim, 2017; Kang, Kim, and Liao, 
2019). This is because an increase in a bank’s tail risk imposes more hardship and costs to its 
operation (Stulz, 2015; Srivastav, Keasey, and Vallascas, 2017). Thus, banker’s sensitivity to 
firm risk even as a board member may be a natural response. Hence, ABDs should be 
particularly more sensitive to risk measures for CEO turnover decisions, which leads to our 
second prediction: 
H2) ABDs will be more sensitive to firms’ risks on CEO turnover.
With respect to CEO turnover announcement, stock prices rise when forced dismissals 
are congruent with shareholders’ interests (Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001). And this effect is 
stronger when CEO is dismissed in firms with poor prior firm performance or with good 
corporate governance (Huson et al. 2001; Bonnier and Bruner, 1989; Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; 
Weisbach 1998). We predict that such forced turnover announcement effect will be more 
positive for firms with CBDs because CBDs provide industry-specific financial expertise, are 
trained to monitor actively, and can make better decisions with private information (Diamond, 
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if the market perceives CBDs as better monitors and fire CEOs with poor firm performance, the 
stock market would react more favorably to the news. We therefore formalize H3 and H4 as 
follows: 
H3) When CEO turnover is announced, firms with more CBDs will result in a more positive 
stock market reaction compared to firms with less or without CBDs. 
H4) For firms with CBDs, the market perceives forced turnover news more positively when 
prior performance is poor.
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Dimopoulos and Wagner (2016) both find that firm 
performance improved after CEO was dismissed of lackluster firm performance. Likewise, if 
CBDs dismissed CEOs to correct prior poor firm performance (i.e. if our H4 holds), firm post-
performance should improve after the CEO turnover. Therefore, our H5 is stated as follows:
H5) After the CEO turnover, firm performance improves more for firms with CBDs than for 
those without CBDs. This enhancement in firm performance will be stronger for firms with 
CBDs when firm’s prior performance was poor. 
III. Data and Empirical Methods 
III.1 Data 
Board of directors data is obtained from BoardEx.1 After running extensive text matching 
algorithms, we obtain an exhaustive link of 27,034 unique firms that can be matched with 
Compustat. 2 We identify CBDs by following Guner et al. (2008) in defining an ABD who works 
for a bank that currently has or had a loan exposure to the monitored company in at least one 
point in time during its history. Firm characteristic variables are from CRSP and Compustat 
while CEO characteristics are obtained from Execucomp.3 KMV Expected default frequency 
measures the default probability during the forthcoming year which we obtained from Moody’s 
KMV.  
CEO turnover data on and before 2001 has been provided by Dirk Jenter.4 For CEO 
turnover data from 2002 to 2008, we hand collected them following Jenter and Kanaan (2015). 
In We follow Parrino (1997) to identify whether a CEO turnover was forced or voluntary, using 
Factiva (see Bushman et al., 2010; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; Kaplan and Minton, 2012).5 
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unobservable reasons behind the turnovers (Huson et al., 2001). As regards, our paper, along 
with the extant literature, will focus only on the forced CEO turnovers. 
III.2 Empirical method
In all multivariate analyses, all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels 
to mitigate possible distortion caused by outliers. To proxy firm performance, we use industry 
median adjusted ROA.6 Industry is classified using Fama-French 49 industry classifications 
using the current SIC code.7 We use several risk measures for firm risk: ROA risk, idiosyncratic 
risk, stock return risk, and KMV Expected default risk. ROA risk is the standard deviation of a 
firm’s prior five years of industry median adjusted quarterly ROA. Idiosyncratic risk is 
constructed by retrieving the root mean squared error after regressing daily stock returns on the 
CRSP value-weighted index (Bushman et al., 2010). Stock return risk is the standard deviation of 
a firm’s annualized daily stock return. KMV Expected default risk (KMV EDF) is provided by 
Moody’s, which measures firm’s default probability in the forthcoming year. 
Prior research shows that larger boards and/or boards where CEO is chairman of the 
board (Fama and Jensen, 1983) are considered weak. Weak boards have lower CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity, indicating board’s less monitoring of top management (see Goyal and 
Park, 2001). Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2014) further explain that CEO turnover sensitivity 
declines with tenure. Accordingly, we control for such factors in our forced CEO turnover 
regressions. We follow Adams and Ferreira (2009) controlling for the fraction of independent 
directors and its interaction terms in all regression specifications.  
IV. Empirical results
IV.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the distribution across industries. Approximately 9.36% of all firm-years 
in our sample have at least one CBDs. 
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for firm-years of full sample and between two 
groups whether they have a CBD or not. It appears that CBDs sit on boards of larger firms, firms 
with less cash flow, and less risky firms, consistent with the literature that bankers tend to sit on 
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boards with weak governance; i.e. boards whose chairman is a CEO, and firms with an insider 
CEO, with less CEO ownership, with larger board size, and with less independent directors. 
[Insert Table 2 here]
IV.2 Forced turnover regressions
Table 3 uses logit model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 
one when there is a forced turnover. All specifications in Table 3 include industry and year 
dummies to control for time invariant unobservable heterogeneity. Table 3, columns (1) and (2) 
show that simply having outsider directors or CBDs do not have a significant relationship on 
CEO turnover decisions. On the other hand, Table 3 columns (3) and (4) show that as there are 
more ABDs, CEO will be more likely be fired, especially when prior ROA performance is poor. 
The coefficient estimates of NABDs, and its interaction terms with ROA performance show 
statistical insignificance as well as smaller economic magnitude. 8 Overall, Table 3 results are 
consistent with Mitchell (2015) and Şişli-Ciamarra (2012) that ABDs are the ones who have the 
most incentive to monitor.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 results indicate that ABDs are also sensitive to firm risk on CEO turnover as the 
interaction coefficients with risk measures show a statistically significant positive sign in all 
Panels. It is interesting to see that CEO turnover is sensitive to risk measure only for the firms 
with more ABDs. This effect is economically significant as well, as can be seen by the marginal 
effects of column (4) (shown in column (5)) in Table 4 Panel A. On the other hand, none of the 
NABDs are associated with risk measure on CEO dismissals, except when risk is proxied by 
ROA risk (see Panel C). However, we find that coefficient estimate on the interaction 
between %ABD and ROA risk in column (4) is significantly larger than that between %NABD 
and ROA risk. This implies that ABDs are more sensitive to firm risk than any other types of 
CBDs, resulting in more CEO dismissals. This implies that CEOs’ dismissals are risk-sensitive 
with ABDs, whereas NABDs are not/less responsive to firm’s risk. This is consistent with the 
view that creditors are risk-averse (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sarasvathy et al., 1998).9 
[Insert Table 4 here]
Overall, results in Table 3 and 4 suggest that ABDs are performance sensitive but also 
sensitive to firms’ risk on CEO’s dismissal unlike other independent directors. These results 
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IV.3 Announcement returns on forced CEO turnover news
In this section we see whether CBD’s presence yields any positive effect on shareholder’s 
wealth when CEO forced turnover is announced. We use data that have both CEO forced 
turnover data and BoardEx data. As regards, we start with a total of 351 forced turnovers. 
Among them, 17 observations are deleted due to confounding events10 and any observations with 
missing financial data are eliminated. As a result, we use 317 forced turnovers to examine the 
CEO turnover announcement effect. 
Table 5, Panel A reports abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for all firms, while Panel B compares ARs and CARs for firms with and without CBDs. To 
calculate CARs, we use standard event study methodology used in the literature. ARs are 
calculated using the market model with CRSP value-weighted index.11 The parameters are 
estimated over 120 days where the ending day of the estimation period is 30 days prior to the 
announcement date. 
[Insert Table 5 here]
Both Panels A and B report ARs of -1, 0, and + 1 day and CARs for the windows (-1,+1), 
(-2,+2), (-5,+5), and (-10, +10), where t=0 is the CEO turnover announced date. Panel A shows 
that forced CEO turnovers are generally considered as negative news in our sample. However, 
Table 5 Panel B shows that firms with CBDs experience favorable stock market reaction to 
forced CEO turnover news. For example, the mean (median) CARs (-1, +1) is -1.14% (-0.34%) 
for firms without CBDs while CARs for firms with CBDs is 3.52% (0.60%) and the difference of 
mean (median) CARs is statistically significant. This result supports H3 that CBDs’ existence is 
positively associated with forced CEO turnover news. 
Table 5, Panel C presents the summary statistics and test of difference between the firms 
with and without CBDs for 317 firms that experienced forced CEO turnovers and shows similar 
results as the overall sample shown in Table 2. 
IV.4 Multivariate analysis on forced CEO turnover announcement returns  
To further examine H3 and investigate H4, we perform a multivariate analysis with OLS 
regression using CAR (-1,+1) as our dependent variable. We follow the CEO turnover and 
corporate governance literature in selecting control variables. We control for firm size12, firm 
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equity and 1{CEO outsider succession} dummy, where the variable equals one when the CEO is 
succeeded by an outsider. We also include industry and year dummies to control for any possible 
fixed effects for all models and the standard errors are clustered at firm level.13 Due to limited 
data, we only perform multivariate analyses with fraction of CBDs and do not examine the effect 
of ABDs.14 
Regression results in columns (1) – (2) of Table 6 confirm that the market on average 
reacts positively to forced CEO turnover news when there are more CBDs.15 The result is not 
only statistically significant but also economically significant: with one standard deviation 
increase in the fraction of CBD (4.5%), it increases forced CEO turnover announcement effect 
on stock return by 1.24% point when the average CAR (-1, +1) is -0.69%. This finding implies 
that the CEO dismissal decision is generally more positive to shareholders when there are more 
CBDs. 
[Insert Table 6 here]
In order to examine H4, we include interaction terms with performance and director 
variables on CARs (-1,+1). The results are reported in columns (3) – (8) of Table 6. Only when 
performance measures are interacted with the fraction of CBD do we see a statistically 
significant negative sign. Column (5) shows that one standard deviation increase in %CBD 
(4.5%) and one standard deviation lower industry adjusted ROA of 19.2% would result in 1.7% 
point higher investor response on forced CEO turnover announcement. In addition, Column (8) 
shows that one standard deviation increase in %CBD (4.5%) and one standard deviation lower 
industry adjusted cash flow (2.214) would result in 0.54% point higher investor response on 
forced CEO turnover announcement. Considering the unconditional mean of CAR (-1, +1) being 
-0.69%, these positive effects of having CBDs is economically significant. Overall, these results 
support our H3 and H4. 
However, when CBD is interacted with risk, as seen in Table 7, we do not find any 
significant results on forced CEO turnover announcement effect. This may imply that the CBDs’ 
firing decision rule based on firm risk to reduce downside risk is not necessarily value-enhancing 
for shareholders, supporting Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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IV.5 Post-performance and post-risk analyses
The post-turnover analysis is based on the same data used for analyzing the forced CEO 
turnover announcement effect. Figure 1 Panel A shows the industry median adjusted ROA from 
4 years prior to 3 years after the CEO turnover year. The group is divided for firms with and 
without CBDs. Figure 1 shows that both groups’ ROA falls rapidly until the CEO turnover year 
and slightly increases post-CEO-turnover-year. Although post-ROA performance is slightly 
better in firms with CBDs than ones without CBDs, the difference between the two groups are 
not statistically different. To examine whether these performance changes meaningfully from 
year to year by different groups of firms, we perform a difference-in-difference (DID) test and 
results are shown in Figure 1 Panel B.  It shows that firms with CBDs have less and less negative 
ROA changes after the CEO turnover whereas firms without CBDs have more and more negative 
ROA changes for the same period.16 
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 2 Panel A shows the idiosyncratic risk from 2 years prior to 2 years after the CEO 
turnover year. It shows that both group’s idiosyncratic risk rises slightly before the CEO turnover 
year and then falls after the CEO dismissal. It also shows that firms with CBDs generally have 
lower idiosyncratic risk for all time periods, confirming prior literature that bankers tend to sit on 
less risky firms. Figure 2 Panel B shows the DID test to examine whether these idiosyncratic risk 
changes year to year depending on whether the firms have CBDs or not. Panel B of Figure 2 
shows that firms with CBDs changes idiosyncratic risk more drastically compared to prior-CEO-
turnover-year than those without CBDs. 
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Although univariate analyses on post-performance or post-risk show no statistical 
significance, we find an interesting pattern: for firms with CBDs, post-performance rises more 
while post-risk decreases further. The non-statistical difference may be due to unobserved factors. 
Hence, we perform multivariate analyses. 
 First, we analyze post-performance with dependent variable being a change in industry 
median adjusted ROA between the CEO-turnover-year (t=0) and one year after (t=+1). The 
results are presented in Table 8. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 indicate that when there are 
more CBDs, the industry median adjusted ROA increases after 1 year since the CEO turnover 
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without one, possibly by providing appropriate financial advice and expertise. Moreover, this 
result is economically significant: the unconditional mean of the industry adjusted ROA before 
the CEO turnover for this data sample is 0.024%. Having one standard deviation higher 
percentage of CBD (4.5%) and one standard deviation lower industry adjusted ROA (19.2%) 
before CEO turnover would lead to 4.5%-point increase in industry adjusted ROA one year after 
the CEO turnover. 
[Insert Table 8 here]
Next, we perform multivariate analyses on post-risk in Table 9. Panel A of Table 9 uses 
change of idiosyncratic risk performance from CEO turnover year to 1 year after as a dependent 
variable. In Panel A, columns (1) – (3) include interaction with 1{High change of  Idio.risk (-2, -
1)}, which represents a dummy variable where the variable equals one if the change of 
Idiosyncratic risk (-2, -1) is in the 4th quartile and zero otherwise. Columns (4) – (6) use 
interaction with the level variable of idiosyncratic risk measured at one year prior to the CEO 
turnover year. We find that with more CBDs, when the change of the idiosyncratic risk was 
high17 between t= -2 and t= -1 or when prior year’s idiosyncratic risk was high, then post-
idiosyncratic risk decreases. 
[Insert Table 9 here]
Likewise, Panel B of Table 9 shows similar result using ROA risk. Columns (1) – (3) 
uses the change of ROA risk from CEO turnover announced year (t=0) to one year after (t=+1), 
while columns (4) – (6) uses the change of ROA risk from t=0 to t=+2 as the dependent variable. 
We find that higher the ROA risk in prior year, the lower the ROA risk one year after the CEO 
turnover year with more CBDs for both categories of the dependent variables. 
Overall, post-turnover analyses suggest that performance increases more for firms with 
CBDs one year after the CEO is fired when prior year’s ROA was inferior, while post-risk 
decreases when prior year’s risk was high for firms with CBDs. Such results infer that CBDs are 
firing poor-performing CEOs leading to a higher performance after the CEO dismissal. But also 
post-risk analysis results suggest that CBD-firms are more involved in firing risk-loving CEOs 
and later leading the newly-appointed CEO to focus on reducing firm risk, an action that may be 
in conflict with shareholders’ interests.  
We recognize the concern that CBDs may self-select to sit on certain type of boards.18 To 















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Kang and Kim (2017) and Kang, Kim, and Liao (2019) in our untabulated analysis. In addition, 
we employ the propensity score matching procedure to ensure the results are not driven by small 
outliers and/or by systematic differences between CBD-firms and non-CBD-firms in our 
untabulated analysis.19 We find that our baseline analysis that ABDs are both sensitive to firm 
performance and firm risk with respect to CEO dismissal is robust.
V. Conclusion
CBDs are double edged swords in providing incentives to the CEOs. Having bankers on 
board brings natural conflict of interest despite the financial expertise they may bring to the table. 
While Kang and Kim (2017) show that the presence of CBDs makes the explicit incentive of 
CEO pay become less sensitive to risk, our study shows that the presence of CBDs makes the 
implicit incentive of CEO turnover become more sensitive to both performance and risk. While 
the portion of US firms with CBDs is diminishing, it is still high in other countries with ‘bank 
based economic development (Allen and Gale, 2000; Goldsmith, 1969; La Porta, 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2004)’ as in Europe and Asia 
(Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Levine, 2002). Also, this paper that studies the governance effect 
of CBDs is important because it extends the testing of conflict of interest theory between two 
different kinds of investors in capital market, the debt-holders and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), formerly applied in various aspects of corporate finance, such as capital 
structure ( Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012), M&As (Hilscher and Şişli-Ciamarra, 2013), investments 
(Guner et al., 2008), R&D investment (Ghosh, 2016) and accounting conservatism (Erkens et al., 
2014). 
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Appendix. Variable definitions (alphabetical order)
1 {High CEO ownership}
Dummy variable, where the value equals 1 when CEO owns more than 5% 
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1 yr excess stock return 
Annualized daily stock returns subtracted by CRSP value-weighted index 
[return-CRSP value weighted index]
1{CBD}
Dummy variable, where the value equals 1 when a firm has a CBD and 
zero otherwise
1{CEO retirement age}
Dummy variable, where the value equals 1 when CEO age is between 63 
and 65 years old, and zero otherwise
1{Chairman=CEO}
Dummy variable, where the value equals 1 when CEO is also a chairman 
and zero otherwise
1{CEO outsider succession}
Dummy variable, where the value equals 1 when successive CEO was an 
outsider
%ABD Fraction of ABDs, following Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2011) 
%CBD Fraction of CBDs 
Fraction of NABDs,
%NABD
calculated as %CBD - %ABD
%Outside Directors Independent director percentage 
BE/ME Book-to-market equity, calculated as  ceq / (prcc_f * csho)
Board members The number of directors serving on a firm’s board
Ln(board size) Natural Log(board size), where board size is the number of board members
Cash flow (CF/k)
Defined as CF/k ; calculated as  sum(ib, dp) / lagppent;, where lagppent is 
lagged PPENT from Compustat data
Cash flow (ind. Adj.)
A firm’s cash flow less the median cash flow in the same industry. 
Industry is defined using Fama-French 49 industry classification
CEO age The age of the CEO
CEO tenure
Tenure of a CEO which measures how long a CEO has been working in 
that firm
Idiosyncratic risk
“Sigma” = RMSE of running a market model using EVENTUS (where 
estimation length =256) (but for missing sigma, replaced with RMSE 
where estimation.length=20) which follows Bushman et al. (2010)
KMV EDF KMV Estimated default frequency from Moody's data
Firm size
Natural log(total assets), where total assets is AT variable from Compustat 
data 
MAV_BOARDSIZE_IR Trailing three-year moving average of board size
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(#CH/#AT).
MAV_KMVEDF Trailing three-year moving average of KMV EDF
MAV_LAT Trailing three-year moving average of the natural logarithm of total assets .
MAV_INSIDERPCT
Trailing three-year moving average of the percentage of insiders of board 
members.
MAV_NOCREDIT
Trailing three-year moving average of an indicator variable that is one if 
the credit rating is missing, and zero otherwise.
MAV_MTB
Trailing three-year moving average of the market value of equity divided 
by book value of equity.
MAV_RATINGNO
Trailing three-year moving average of the credit rating by S&P in which 
the rating is transformed to numbers: better credit quality takes a higher 
number. We assign 22 to an AAA rating and 0 to a CCC rating.
MAV_RETVOL
Trailing three-year moving average of the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over the fiscal year
MAV_RNDAT
Trailing three-year moving average of R&D expense divided by total 
assets 
MAV_TLTA Trailing three-year moving average of total leverage divided by total assets
ROA (ind.adj.)
Industry median adjusted ROA, where ROA = oibdp/at (from 
COMPUSTAT) 
ROA risk
An accounting-based risk measure used in Bushman et al. (2010); Standard 
deviation of prior 5 years of quarterly ROA, where ROA is calculated as 
oibdpq / atq from fundq table of COMPUSTAT; Before calculating for 
standard deviation, industry median is adjusted
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Figure 1. ROA PERFORMANCE BEFORE AND AFTER CEO TURNOVER
The sample period is 1999-2008. The figures show industry median adjusted ROA graphs before and after the CEO 
turnover event, where t = 0 is the year when the CEO was forced out. The dotted values are average values. 
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Figure 2. IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK BEFORE AND AFTER CEO TURNOVER
The sample period is 1999-2008. The figures show idiosyncratic risk graphs before and after the CEO turnover 
event, where t = 0 is the year when the CEO was forced out. 
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Table 1. Sample distribution by year, industry, and number of firms with banker directors
The sample period is 1999-2008. Firm-years in our sample is an intersection of Execucomp, Boardex, Compustat and Crsp. The sample consists of 12,608 firm-
years, of which 1,180 have commercial banker directors (CBDs) in their firm boards. We use the Boardex data to identify banker directors on board. Industry 























1999 0 (0) 3 (1) 26 (6) 36 (3) 9 (3) 17 (3) 18 (3) 17 (1) 2 (0) 2 (1) 130 (21)
2000 4 (0) 53 (3) 174 (25) 288 (25) 123 (26) 143 (18) 172 (18) 120 (12) 36 (3) 3 (1) 1,116 (131)
2001 5 (0) 62 (4) 192 (28) 344 (27) 132 (31) 155 (18) 198 (18) 141 (8) 43 (3) 5 (1) 1,277 (138)
2002 4 (0) 63 (6) 195 (31) 346 (26) 134 (26) 151 (19) 195 (17) 141 (10) 45 (3) 5 (1) 1,279 (139)
2003 5 (1) 75 (2) 233 (33) 424 (23) 154 (36) 192 (21) 238 (25) 180 (11) 58 (4) 6 (1) 1,565 (157)
2004 6 (1) 82 (4) 244 (34) 438 (18) 160 (29) 186 (16) 241 (31) 184 (9) 58 (1) 6 (1) 1,605 (144)
2005 6 (1) 80 (3) 241 (30) 423 (15) 157 (25) 182 (16) 248 (23) 174 (8) 58 (0) 5 (1) 1,574 (122)
2006 5 (0) 84 (3) 247 (29) 440 (20) 164 (26) 187 (18) 285 (27) 174 (7) 65 (2) 5 (1) 1,656 (133)
2007 4 (0) 88 (5) 240 (26) 415 (19) 154 (24) 188 (16) 288 (25) 172 (6) 62 (2) 4 (0) 1,615 (123)
2008 2 (0) 47 (2) 134 (15) 218 (16) 90 (17) 53 (4) 139 (10) 75 (7) 30 (1) 3 (0) 791 (72)
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
The sample period is 1999-2008. The sample consists of 12,608 firm-years, 1,180 of which have banker directors on their firm board. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Variable descriptions are in the Appendix.
Total sample no CBD: A has CBD: B Difference Test (A-B)





Firm Size 12608 7.772 7.601 1.7289 11428 7.692 7.5309 1180 8.549 8.4757 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
1yr excess stock return 12608 0.089 0.018 0.5202 11428 0.091 0.0178 1180 0.070 0.0184 0.178 0.981
ROA (ind.adj.) 12608 0.049 0.031 0.1234 11428 0.050 0.0311 1180 0.046 0.0258 0.354 0.223
Cash flow (ind.adj) 12608 -0.766 0.134 159.1090 11428 -0.871 0.1478 1180 0.257 0.0449 0.817 0.000 ***
idiosyncratic risk 12608 0.023 0.020 0.0124 11428 0.023 0.0202 1180 0.020 0.0175 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Stock return risk 12608 0.026 0.023 0.0137 11428 0.027 0.0232 1180 0.023 0.0202 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
ROA risk 12070 0.016 0.011 0.0200 10926 0.017 0.0113 1144 0.012 0.0087 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
KMV EDF 11661 0.815 0.136 2.8425 10574 0.850 0.1378 1087 0.477 0.1182 0.000 *** 0.001 ***
CEO age 12608 55.616 56.00 7.511 11428 56.336 56.000 1180 55.540 55.000 0.001 *** 0.000 ***
CEO tenure 12608 7.889 5.000 7.6901 11428 8.004 5.0000 1180 6.783 5.0000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
1{Chairman=CEO} 12608 0.686 1.000 0.4642 11428 0.676 1.0000 1180 0.781 1.0000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
1{High CEO Ownership} 12608 0.039 0.000 0.1933 11428 0.041 0.0000 1180 0.018 0.0000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
1{CEO outsider succession} 12608 0.200 0.000 0.4003 11428 0.204 0.0000 1180 0.165 0.0000 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
Board members 12608 9.512 9.501 2.3890 11428 9.405 9.5009 1180 10.550 10.0000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Board size 12608 2.328 2.352 0.2210 11428 2.318 2.3515 1180 2.425 2.3979 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
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%CBD 12608 0.011 0.000 0.0382 11428 0.000 0.000 1180 0.115 0.1000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
%ABD 12608 0.014 0.000 0.1173 11428 0.000 0.000 1180 0.012 0.0000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
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Table 3. CEO turnover and Performance 
The sample period is 1999-2008. The dependent variable is forced turnover, defined as one if there is a forced 
turnover and zero otherwise. Logit regressions are performed. Industry (four-digit SIC code) and year dummies are 
included in all specifications.  Independent and control variables are lagged by one year.  *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values 
based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in every second line. Control variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
Dep. Variable: 1{forced CEO turnover} (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
%Outside Directors -0.128 -0.154 -0.107 -0.139







ROA(ind.adj.)*%Outside Directors 0.741 0.712 0.691 0.688







ROA(ind.adj.) -0.934** -0.928** -0.921** -0.926**
0.021 0.022 0.023 0.023
idiosyncratic risk 19.197*** 19.238*** 19.069*** 19.083***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Size 0.041 0.039 0.043 0.042
0.365 0.387 0.340 0.360
1{CEO retirement age} -0.872*** -0.872*** -0.871*** -0.871***
0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
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0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1{Chairman=CEO} -0.354*** -0.357*** -0.351*** -0.353***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
1{High CEO Ownership} -0.065 -0.075 -0.073 -0.085
0.860 0.841 0.845 0.819
constant -16.007*** -15.983*** -15.277*** -16.376***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 12246 12246 12246 12246
Pseudo.R2 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.058 
Table 4. CEO turnover and Risk 
The sample period is 1999-2008. The dependent variable is forced turnover, defined as one if there is a forced 
turnover and zero otherwise. Logit regressions are performed. Industry (four-digit SIC code) and year dummies are 
included in all specifications. Independent and control variables are lagged by one year. As a risk measure, Panel A 
uses idiosyncratic risk, Panel B uses stock return risk, and Panel C uses ROA risk. Column (5) in Panel A shows the 
average marginal effects of column (4) regression. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values based on heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors are in every second line. Control variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Panel A. Interaction with idiosyncratic risk measure




%Outside Directors -0.121 -0.148 -0.107 -0.138 -0.004
0.746 0.691 0.774 0.710 0.711
%CBD 1.236
0.551
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idiosyncratic risk*%Outside Directors -21.516 -20.945 -19.526 -18.480 -0.473
0.596 0.606 0.629 0.647 0.647
idiosyncratic risk*%CBD 14.289
0.823
idiosyncratic risk*%ABD 2,200.119*** 2,188.475*** 56.006***
0.000 0.000 0.000
idiosyncratic risk*%NABD -14.379 -0.368
0.833 0.833
ROA(ind.adj.) -0.891*** -0.889*** -0.892*** -0.885*** -0.023***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
idiosyncratic risk 19.382*** 19.299*** 19.108*** 19.237*** 0.492***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Size 0.042 0.040 0.043 0.041 0.001
0.358 0.377 0.337 0.362 0.361
1{CEO retirement age} -0.872*** -0.873*** -0.888*** -0.888*** -0.023***
0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009
CEO tenure -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1{Chairman=CEO} -0.353*** -0.356*** -0.347*** -0.349*** -0.009***
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
1{High CEO Ownership} -0.062 -0.071 -0.057 -0.071 -0.002
0.866 0.848 0.877 0.849 0.849
constant -16.891*** -16.867*** -15.149*** -15.123***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 12246 12246 12246 12246 12246
Pseudo.R2 0.056 0.056 0.058 0.058   
Panel B. Interaction with stock return risk measure
Dep. Variable: 1{forced CEO turnover} (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
%Outside Directors -0.101 -0.136 -0.088 -0.127






















Stock return risk*%Outside Directors -14.290 -13.450 -12.487 -11.310
0.695 0.711 0.730 0.754
Stock return risk*%CBD 113.368
0.187
Stock return risk*%ABD 1,275.911*** 1,282.953***
0.000 0.000
Stock return risk*%NABD 82.786
0.357
1 yr excess stock return -1.185*** -1.185*** -1.188*** -1.188***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stock return risk 18.553*** 18.308*** 18.266*** 18.182***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm Size 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.020
0.689 0.679 0.665 0.663
1{CEO retirement age} -0.837** -0.840** -0.852** -0.854**
0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012
CEO tenure -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.045***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1{Chairman=CEO} -0.390*** -0.397*** -0.384*** -0.391***
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
1{High CEO Ownership} -0.099 -0.107 -0.098 -0.110
0.787 0.770 0.790 0.765
constant -16.636*** -15.872*** -16.266*** -15.998***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 12246 12246 12246 12246 
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Panel C. Interaction with ROA risk measure
Dep. Variable: 1{forced CEO turnover} (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
%Outside Directors -0.224 -0.246 -0.201 -0.230







ROA risk*%Outside Directors -40.336** -38.835** -39.930** -38.251**
0.026 0.033 0.028 0.036
ROA risk*%CBD 54.859***
0.005




ROA(ind.adj.) -1.321*** -1.408*** -1.333*** -1.415***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA risk 3.411* 1.611 3.301 1.555
0.092 0.382 0.108 0.402
Firm Size -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.004
0.968 0.887 0.992 0.926
1{CEO retirement age} -0.882*** -0.883*** -0.884*** -0.886***
0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009
CEO tenure -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.044***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1{Chairman=CEO} -0.403*** -0.404*** -0.399*** -0.399***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
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0.919 0.912 0.932 0.917
constant -15.430*** -15.834*** -14.703*** -16.354***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 11665 11665 11665 11665
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Table 5. Univariate tests: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around forced turnover announcement date 
The sample period is 1999-2008. To calculate for the abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), we use the standard event study 
methodology used in the literature. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with CRSP value-weighted index. The parameters are estimated over 
120 days where ending day of the estimation period is 30 days prior to the announcement, where t=0 is the CEO turnover announced date. Panel A reports Ars 
and CARs for all forced CEO turnover announcement news. Panel B reports ARs and CARs for firms with and without CBDs. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Test of difference shows p-value.
Panel A. ARs and CARs for all firms
 Obs Mean Median T-test Patell Test BMP Test Sign-rank statistics
AR(-1) 317 0.16% -0.04% 0.2442  0.1741 0.2296 0.4629  
AR(0) 317 -0.45% -0.27% 0.1086 0.0000 *** 0.0466 ** 0.0720 *
AR(+1) 317 -0.40% -0.24% 0.1544 0.0223 ** 0.1930 0.0939 *
CAR (-1,+1) 317 -0.69% -0.27% 0.1311 0.0005 *** 0.0715 * 0.1465
CAR (-2,+2) 317 -1.04% -0.44% 0.0612 * 0.0002 *** 0.0324 ** 0.0617 *
CAR (-5,+5) 317 -1.38% -0.70% 0.0714 * 0.0001 *** 0.0104 ** 0.0533 *
CAR (-10,+10) 317 -1.56% -1.83% 0.0980 * 0.0000 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0178 **
Panel B. ARs and CARs for firms with and without CBD
No CBD  Has CBD  Test of difference
 (N=286) : A  (N = 31) : B  (B-A)  
 Mean t-test  Median
Sign-rank 
statistics
 Mean t-test  Median
Sign-rank 
statistics
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AR(0) -0.59% 0.1295 -0.33% 0.0553* 0.82% 0.4542 0.21% 0.2811 0.2533 0.0950*
AR(+1) -0.73% 0.0680* -0.28% 0.0518* 2.69% 0.0825* 0.17% 0.0811* 0.0096*** 0.0212**
CAR (-1,+1) -1.14% 0.0829* -0.34% 0.0931* 3.52% 0.0295** 0.60% 0.0745* 0.0250** 0.0277**
CAR (-2,+2) -1.49% 0.0397** -0.71% 0.0353** 3.12% 0.0658* 0.98% 0.1124 0.0430* 0.0306**
CAR (-5,+5) -1.84% 0.0746* -0.87% 0.0276** 2.90% 0.0400** 2.43% 0.0778* 0.1369 0.0218**
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Panel C. Summary statistics for forced turnover announcement date data
The sample period is 1999-2008. The table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), where the abnormal returns are calculated based on the market-
model. The market model is estimated using returns from -150 to -31 days from the CEO turnover announced date and uses the CRSP value-weighted index as a 
proxy for the market portfolio. The CAR is calculated over the (-t, +t) window, where t=0 is the day of the CEO turnover announcement. Confounding events 
such as M&As, earnings announcements, restatements, and class action lawsuits within +1/-1 day from the CEO turnover announcement day are excluded from 
the sample. 
 CAR (-1, +1) sample Has CBD: A No CBD: B Test of difference 
(N = 317) (N = 31) (N = 286) (A-B)





Firm size 7.591 7.440 2.041 8.826 9.256 1.920 7.457 7.276 2.012 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
1 yr excess stock return -0.105 -0.151 0.476 -0.173 -0.159 0.231 -0.098 -0.150 0.495 0.405 0.609
ROA (ind.adj.) 0.024 0.025 0.192 0.037 0.007 0.127 0.022 0.025 0.198 0.682 0.956
Cash flow (CF/k) 0.202 0.023 2.214 0.666 0.111 2.599 0.151 0.020 2.168 0.219 0.144
Idiosyncratic risk 0.025 0.022 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.010 0.026 0.023 0.014 0.084 * 0.099 *
Stock return risk 0.028 0.026 0.014 0.025 0.022 0.012 0.028 0.026 0.014 0.177 0.186
ROA risk 0.020 0.014 0.028 0.025 0.011 0.068 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.282 0.074 *
KMV EDF 1.363 0.222 3.558 0.659 0.183 1.086 1.441 0.227 3.726 0.246 0.312
Director Variables
%Outside directors 84.32% 87.50% 0.165 83.90% 85.71% 0.152 84.36% 87.50% 0.166 0.881 0.663
%CBDs 1.29% 0.00% 0.045 13.20% 10.00% 0.071 0.00% 0.00% 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
%ABDs 0.03% 0.00% 0.005 0.27% 0.00% 0.015 0.00% 0.00% 0.000 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
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Table 6. CARs around forced CEO turnover - Interaction of CBDs with Performance measures
The sample period is 1999-2008. The dependent variable is CAR(-1, +1) for firms with forced CEO turnover announcement. In columns (1) – (2), the effect of 
CBD’s existence on CEO turnover announcement is observed and in columns (3) – (8), interaction analysis with performance measure is performed: 
Performance measure used in (3) – (5) is industry median adjusted ROA and in (6) – (8) is cash flow.  Year and industry dummies are included in all 
specifications. Industry is defined using Fama-French 49 industry classification. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in every second line. Control variables 
are defined in the Appendix.
Interaction with Performance measures              
Performance measure used: No Interaction  ROA (ind.adj.)  Cash flow (ind.adj.)  
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
%Outside Directors 0.135 *** 0.131 *** 0.15 *** 0.148 *** 0.164 *** 0.139 *** 0.143 *** 0.143 ***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
%CBD 0.276 ** 0.345 ** 0.361 *** 0.354 ** 0.348 **
(0.045) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.016)
ROA(ind.adj.)*%Outside Directors -0.184 -0.288
(0.532) (0.315)
ROA(ind.adj.)*%CBD -1.926 ** -1.981 **
(0.028) (0.027)
Cash flow(ind.adj.)*%Outside Directors 0.008 0.007
(0.471) (0.554)
Cash flow(ind.adj.)*%CBD -0.053 * -0.054 *
(0.092) (0.082)
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ROA(ind.adj.) 0.164 -0.001 0.274
(0.584) (0.961) (0.348)
Cash flow(ind.adj.) -0.007 0.001 -0.006
(0.503) (0.228) (0.620)
idiosyncratic risk -0.035 -0.023 -0.001 -0.065 -0.071 0.041 0.015 0.017
(0.960) (0.974) (0.999) (0.924) (0.917) (0.954) (0.983) (0.981)
Firm size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(0.423) (0.414) (0.530) (0.418) (0.475) (0.433) (0.297) (0.285)
BE/ME -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007
(0.740) (0.759) (0.968) (0.719) (0.954) (0.815) (0.738) (0.707)
1{CEO outsider succession} 0.009 0.007 0.01 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.009
(0.522) (0.599) (0.490) (0.645) (0.651) (0.424) (0.524) (0.496)
constant -0.021 -0.026 -0.034 -0.008 -0.029 -0.022 -0.058 -0.056
(0.771) (0.727) (0.650) (0.911) (0.711) (0.761) (0.427) (0.438)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 317  317  317  317  317  317  317  317  
Adj.R2 0.035  0.046  0.03  0.053  0.052  0.029  0.052  0.049  
Table 7. CARs around forced CEO turnover - Interaction of CBDs with Risk measures
The sample period is 1999-2008. The dependent variable is CAR(-1, +1) for firms that announced forced CEO turnover. Risk measure is interacted with director 
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measure. Year and industry dummies are included in all specifications. Industry is defined using Fama-French 49 industry classification. *, **, and *** indicate 
the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values based on heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors are in every second line. Control variables are defined in the Appendix.
Interaction with Risk measures            
Risk measure used: KMV Expected Default Risk Chg in KMV Expected Default Risk
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
%Outside Directors 0.094 * 0.153 *** 0.086 * 0.117 ** 0.123 ** 0.111 **
(0.065) (0.006) (0.098) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
%CBD 0.434 ** 0.437 ** 0.327 *** 0.329 **
(0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011)
KMV EDF*%Outside Directors 0.041 *** 0.041 ***
(0.004) (0.003)
KMV EDF*%CBD -0.012 -0.003
(0.927) (0.984)
change in KMV EDF*%Outside Directors 0.032 * 0.032 *
(0.080) (0.077)
change in KMV EDF*%CBD 0.021 0.007
(0.786) (0.930)
1yr excess stock return -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 0.02 0.018 0.023
(0.219) (0.268) (0.257) (0.229) (0.266) (0.167)
ROA (ind.adj.) -0.536 -0.37 -0.567 0.011 0.005 0.011
(0.466) (0.622) (0.434) (0.744) (0.885) (0.729)
Firm size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
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BE/ME -0.015 -0.003 -0.016 -0.007 0.001 -0.006
(0.390) (0.839) (0.365) (0.708) (0.938) (0.756)
1{CEO outsider succession} 0.002 0.003 0 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.896) (0.770) (0.989) (0.720) (0.787) (0.828)
KMV EDF -0.028 *** 0.003 -0.028 ***
(0.006) (0.318) (0.004)
change in KMV EDF -0.016 0.009 *** -0.016
(0.284) (0.006) (0.291)
constant 0.101 0.035 0.083 -0.305 * -0.347 ** -0.317 *
(0.380) (0.764) (0.485) (0.060) (0.034) (0.052)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 310 310 310  308  308  308  
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Table 8. Changes in ROA and CBDs
The sample period is 1999-2008. OLS regression is performed where the dependent variable is industry median 
adjusted change in ROA from year 0 to +1, which t= 0 is the year when CEO turnover was announced. Year and 
industry dummies are included in all specifications. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values based on heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors are in every second line. Control variables are defined in the Appendix.
Dependent variable: Chg in  ROA (0, +1) (1)  (2)  (3)  
%Outside Directors -0.121 ** -0.057 -0.091 *
(0.016) (0.132) (0.062)
%CBD 0.707 ** 0.685 **
(0.018) (0.022)
ROA*%Outside Directors 0.416 0.29
(0.155) (0.281)
ROA*%CBD -5.36 * -5.206 *
(0.083) (0.092)
ROA -0.44 -0.026 -0.303
(0.139) (0.488) (0.262)
idiosyncratic risk 1.342 *** 1.32 *** 1.212 ***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Firm size 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.577) (0.627) (0.799)
BE/ME 0.01 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 **
(0.006) (0.003) (0.010)
1{CEO outsider succession} 0 -0.004 -0.004
(0.978) (0.729) (0.725)
constant -0.104 -0.172 *** -0.119 *
(0.143) (0.000) (0.091)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 336  336  336  
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Table 9. Changes in Risk measure and CBDs
The sample period is 1999-2008. In Panel A, OLS regression is performed where the dependent variable is change in Idiosyncratic risk from year 0 to +1, which 
t= 0 is the year when CEO turnover was announced. In Panel A, columns (1) – (3) include interaction with 1{ High change of  Idio.risk (-2, -1) }, which 
represents a dummy variable where the variable equals one if the change of Idiosyncratic risk (-2, -1) is in the 4th quartile and zero otherwise, and columns (4) – 
(6) use interaction with the level variable of idiosyncratic risk measured at 1 year prior to the CEO turnover. In Panel B, the dependent variable is change in ROA 
risk from year 0 to +1 from columns (1) – (3) and change in ROA risk from year 0 to +2 from columns (4) – (6). Year and industry dummies are included in all 
specifications. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values based 
on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in every second line. Control variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A. Idiosyncratic risk
Dependent variable: change in Idio.risk (0, +1) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
%Outside Directors -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.019 -0.002 0.019
(0.709) (0.596) (0.678) (0.257) (0.819) (0.257)
%CBD 0.002 0.003 0.072 0.072
(0.922) (0.902) (0.109) (0.113)
{High change of Idio.risk (-2, -1)}*%Outside Directors -0.011 -0.015
(0.560) (0.451)
{High change of Idio.risk (-2, -1)}*%CBD -0.095 * -0.100 *
(0.091) (0.061)
Idiosyncratic riskt-1*%Outside Directors -0.843 -0.818
(0.168) (0.195)
Idiosyncratic riskt-1*%CBD -2.958 ** -2.904 **
(0.039) (0.048)
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idiosyncratic riskt-1 0.477 -0.172 0.468
(0.326) (0.181) (0.344)
1yr excess stock return -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.300) (0.382) (0.353) (0.186) (0.180) (0.146)
ROA (ind.adj.) -0.02 -0.023 * -0.024 * -0.027 ** -0.024 * -0.027 **
(0.129) (0.092) (0.093) (0.042) (0.071) (0.037)
Firm size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.826) (0.697) (0.799) (0.655) (0.728) (0.593)
BE/ME 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.890) (0.807) (0.748) (0.857) (0.906) (0.775)
1{CEO outsider succession} 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.550) (0.470) (0.463) (0.484) (0.429) (0.446)
constant 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.012 0.000
(0.501) (0.515) (0.487) (0.912) (0.281) (0.974)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 205  205  205  205  205  205  
Adj.R2 0.073  0.077  0.074  0.099  0.094  0.101  
Panel B. ROA risk
Dependent variable:  change in ROA risk (0 , +1)  change in ROA risk (0 , +2)  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
%Outside Directors 0.007 * 00.000 0.001 0.014 ** 0.003 0.001
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%CBD 0.023 * 0.023 * 0.028 ** 0.029 **
(0.076) (0.069) (0.033) (0.038)
ROA risk*%Outside Directors -0.414 * -0.048 -0.735 ** 0.123
(0.055) (0.798) (0.032) (0.702)
ROA risk*%CBD -0.803 *** -0.77 *** -1.570 *** -1.658 ***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
1yr excess stock return 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.758) (0.922) (0.930) (0.895) (0.508) (0.489)
ROA (ind.adj.) -0.016 *** -0.009 ** -0.01 ** -0.044 *** -0.03 *** -0.029 ***
(0.000) (0.014) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Firm size -0.001 ** -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 **
(0.027) (0.083) (0.084) (0.006) (0.025) (0.025)
BE/ME -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.534) (0.599) (0.577) (0.163) (0.255) (0.293)
1{CEO outsider succession} 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.464) (0.672) (0.664) (0.252) (0.335) (0.352)
ROA risk 0.155 -0.133 ** -0.092 0.28 -0.204 *** -0.309
(0.463) (0.011) (0.608) (0.390) (0.009) (0.274)
constant 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.011 * 0.012 ** 0.012 **
(0.518) (0.311) (0.401) (0.086) (0.047) (0.043)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 304  304  304  289  289  289  
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Footnotes
1 Boardex is a database that contains information of more than 300,000 unique board members of 
publicly-listed companies in the United States and around the world. 
2 BoardEx database provides limited one-to-one link information for 8,622 unique firms in Compustat via 
CIK and we find that BoardEx ID is unique depending on the spelling of a company’s name that each 
director claims. With this respect, multiple company ID’s in BoardEx are not matched with the same 
company in Compustat, leading us to run extensive text matching algorithms. 
3 If an observation is missing, we manually fill it by reading news articles obtained from Factiva. 
4 It is the same data that was used in Jenter and Kanaan (2015)
5 Specifically, when searching newspaper articles in Factiva, we classify a succession as a forced turnover 
if the news articles report that the CEO is fired, forced, ousted, or departed due to unspecified policy 
differences. For the remainder of the transitions, if the incumbent CEO is under the age of 60 and the 
news articles do not report the reason for the departure such as involving death, poor health or accepting 
other positions elsewhere or within the firm, we classify such cases as forced turnovers. In addition, if the 
departing CEO’s accepted new position is with a private consulting business, such case is considered to 
be a forced turnover because the move is from a big public corporation (typically top 1500 largest public 
firms in the US) to a smaller private company. However, moves to the federal or local government are not 
classified as forced. Besides, a “retirement” announcement of a CEO younger than 60 years old is 
considered to be a forced turnover if the succession plan was not announced at least six months prior to 
the actual transition.
6 In our untabulated analyses, we also use the annual excess stock return, which is calculated by 
annualizing 12 months of monthly stock returns and subtracting the CRSP value-weighted index, and find 
qualitatively similar results. 
7 For all missing SIC codes, the industry is defined as industry 49.
8 In an untabulated analysis, we tried a negative net income dummy and a 1-year excess stock return as 
our performance measure in lieu of industry median adjusted ROA and found qualitatively consistent 
results.
9 With respect to the concerns related to the interaction terms of logit models (see Ai and Norton, 2003), 
we have performed the INTEFF analyses following Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). Since we cannot run the 
INTEFF function when there are more than two interaction terms in one regression – i.e. A*B and A*C – 
we reran the logit models of Tables 3 and 4 by including only one interaction term for each regression. 
That is, we ran A, B, and A*B for one regression and A, C and A*C for another regression and so on. 
Generally, after running the INTEFF function for our logit models, the coefficient sign and statistical 
significance holds similar as our Tables 3 and 4.
10 Confounding events include M&As, earnings announcements, restatements, interim-CEO or new CEO 
appointments, and class action lawsuits. We remove the observations if the aforementioned confounding 
events took place 15 calendar days before or after the CEO turnover announcement date.
11 Other models, such as the equally weighted market index model, Fama French 3 factor model, or Fama 
French 4 factor model, show similar inferences on CARs for forced turnover announcements. 
12 Using natural log of sales to proxy for firm size yields qualitatively similar results. 
13 Although not reported in this paper, Industry clustering or two-dimensional clustering, where it is 
clustered at firm- and year-level, show qualitatively similar inferences.
14 In the subset of data, we only have 1 firm-year that has affiliated bankers on the board.
15 In unreported regressions, when fractions of outside directors are split into banker directors and non-
banker directors, we find that both types of directors have positive association with the forced CEO 
turnover announcement returns. What is interesting is that when there are more banker directors on the 
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directors on the board and the difference between these two coefficients is statistically different at 5% 
significance level. This finding implies that banker’s existence on the board has more positive association 
than that of non-banker directors on CEO turnover announcement effect, supporting our H3.
16 However, these ROA changes are not statistically different from firms with banker directors compared 
to firms without banker directors for all periods.
17 Change of idiosyncratic risk is considered high when the change from t= - 2 to t= -1 is in the upper 25% 
among the data sample. 
18 They may self-select to sit on certain boards of firms with less risk, larger size, lower information 
asymmetry, and lower short-term to long-term debt ratio to avoid bankruptcy (see Kroszner and Strahan, 
2001)
19 Please contact the author for details of the untabulated analyses.
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